Abstract. In this paper, we study the security of 2R − schemes [17, 18] , which are the "minus variant" of two-round schemes. This variant consists in removing some of the n polynomials of the public key, and permits to thwart an attack described at Crypto'99 [25] against two-round schemes. Usually, the "minus variant" leads to a real strengthening of the considered schemes. We show here that this is actually not true for 2R
Introduction
Last years a new kind of cryptanalysis has made its entrance in cryptography: the so-called algebraic cryptanalysis. A fundamental issue of this cryptanalysis consists in finding zeroes of algebraic systems. Gröbner bases, which are a fundamental tool of commutative algebra, constitute the most elegant and efficient way for solving this problem. They provide an algorithmic solution for solving several problems related to algebraic systems (some of them can be found in [1] ). We present here a new application of Gröbner bases. More precisely, we propose a new algorithm for solving the Functional Decomposition Problem (FDP). The problem is as follows: Functional Decomposition Problem (FDP) Input : multivariate polynomials h1, . . . , hu. Find : -if any -multivariate polynomials f1, . . . , fu, and g1, . . . , gn, such that: (h1, . . . , hu´=`f1`g1, . . . , gn´, . . . , fu`g1, . . . , gn´´.
This problem is related to security of 2R
− schemes [17, 18] .
Related Works
As stated by E. Biham [6] , "the design of this scheme (2R) is unique as it uses techniques from symmetric ciphers in designing public key cryptosystems, while still claiming security based on relation to the difficulty of decomposing compositions of multivariate ... functions". Anyway, the security of 2R schemes has been already carefully investigated [6, 25, 26] . E. Biham proposed in [6] a successful cryptanalysis of 2R schemes with S-Boxes. This attack exploits the birthday paradox, but can be avoided by increasing the security parameters of 2R schemes [18] . At Crypto'99 [25] , D.F. Ye, Z.D. Dai, and K.Y. Lam have presented a quite efficient method for solving the Functional Decomposition Problem. The security of 2R schemes is indeed related to this problem. To thwart this last attack, L. Goubin and J. Patarin have proposed [18] to use a general technique for repairing multivariate schemes, namely keeping secret some polynomials of the public key. The resulting schemes are called 2R − schemes. Note that V. Carlier, H. Chabanne, and E. Dottax [9] have described a method for protecting the confidentiality of block ciphers design exploiting the principle of 2R − schemes. Usually, the "minus modification" leads to a real strengthening of the considered schemes. For instance, C * is broken [22] while C * −− is the basis of Sflash [10] , the signature scheme recommended for low-cost smart cards by the European consortium Nessie 3 . Here, we show that 2R − is not more secure than 2R.
Organization of the Paper and Main Results
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 by introducing our notations and defining essential tools used in this paper, namely ideals, Gröbner bases, and several operations on ideals (sum, intersection, quotient, . . . ). Section 3 gives a brief review of one-round, 2R and 2R − schemes. We also present the Functional Decomposition problem (FDP) in a more formal manner, which is at the basis of the security of 2R and 2R − schemes. An algorithm for solving this problem efficiently would allow to decompose the public key of 2R and 2R
− schemes into two independent quadratic systems, making thereby the principle of these cryptosystems useless. In Section 4, we present a general algorithm for solving FDP. Our method is inspired on the algorithm of D.F. Ye, Z.D. Dai, and K.Y. Lam [25] . Note that their algorithm only works for particular instances of FDP, namely when u = n, or u = n − 1. Briefly, our algorithm works as follows. Let (h1, . . . , hu´=`f1`g1, . . . , gn´, . . . , fu`g1, . . . , gn´´be an instance of FDP. We
by the partial derivatives of the his. We then show that for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, x d+1 n gi ∈ ∂I h , for some d ≥ 0. In most cases, this allows to recover a basis of the vector space L(g) = Vect(g1, . . . , gn) generated by g1, . . . , gn. This is the most difficult part of our algorithm. The fis being indeed recovered from the knowledge of L(g) by solving a linear system. The complexity of this algorithm depends on the ratio n/u. For example, our algorithm runs in O(n 12 ), if n/u < 1/2. More generally, we provide a global analysis of the theoretical complexity of our method. As a side effect, we give several insights into the theoretical behavior of the algorithm of D.F. Ye, Z.D. Dai, and K.Y. Lam. We conclude this section by providing experimental results illustrating the efficiency of our approach. We have been able to solve in few hours instances of FDP used in 2R − schemes for most of the challenges proposed in [18] .
Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we denote by K[x1, . . . , xn] the polynomial ring in the n indeterminate x1, . . . , xn over a finite field K with q = p r elements (p a prime, and r ≥ 1). The set of polynomials p1, . . . , ps of K[x1, . . . , xn] can be regarded as a mapping K n → K s :
(v1, . . . , vn) →`p1(v1, . . . , vn), . . . , ps(v1, . . . , vn)´.
We will call these polynomials components. We will also denote by I = p1, . . . , ps = { P s k=1 p k u k : u1, . . . , us ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn]} the ideal generated by p1, . . . , ps. We define now essential notions used in this paper. For a more thorough introduction to these tools, we refer to classical books on commutative algebra, such as [1, 11] . Most of the results presented in this part are well known in commutative algebra, and thus given without proofs. For these proofs, we also refer to [1, 11] . The reader already familiar with Gröbner bases and quotient ideals can skip this part.
Gröbner bases
Informally, a Gröbner basis of an ideal is a generatring set of this ideal with "good" algorithmic properties. These bases are defined with respect to monomial orders. Here, we will use the lexicographic (LEX) and degree reverse lexicographical (DRL) orders, which are definedas follows: Definition 1. Let α = (α1, . . . , αn) and β = (β1, . . . , βn) ∈ N n . Then:
n , if the left-most nonzero entry of the vector α − β is positive.
βi and the right-most nonzero entry of α − β is negative.
To define Gröbner bases, we have to introduce the following definitions. Definition 2. For any n-uple α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ N n , we denote by x α the monomial x
We define the total degree of this monomial by the sum P n i=1 αi. The leading monomial of a polynomial f ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn] is the largest monomial -w.r.t some monomial ordering ≺ -among the monomials of f . This leading monomial will be denoted by LM(f, ≺). The leading coefficient of f , denoted by LC(f, ≺), is the coefficient of LM(f, ≺) in f . The degree of f -denoted deg(f ) -is the total degree of LM(f, ≺). Finally, the maximal total degree of f is the maximal total degree of the monomials occurring in f .
We are now ready to define one of the main objects of this paper. Indeed: Definition 3. A set of polynomials G is a Gröbner basis -w.r.t. a monomial ordering ≺ -of an ideal I in K[x1, . . . , xn], if for all f ∈ I there exists g ∈ G such that LM(g, ≺) divides LM(f, ≺). This Gröbner basis is called reduced if, for all g ∈ G, LC(g, ≺) = 1, and any monomial of g ∈ G is not divisible by any element of LM(G\{g}, ≺). Let G be Gröbner basis -w.r.t. a monomial ordering ≺ -of an ideal I in K[x1, . . . , xn], and d be a positive integer. We call d-Gröbner basis (or truncated Gröbner basis) of an homogeneous ideal I the set:
A Gröbner basis of a given ideal is not unique in general. The reduced Gröbner basis allows to achieve uniqueness. A reduced Gröbner basis can be obtained from a Gröbner basis in polynomial-time. Gröbner bases are a fundamental tool to study algebraic systems in theory and practice. They provide an algorithmic solution for solving several problems related to polynomial systems (some of them can be found in [1] ). The historical method for computing Gröbner bases is Buchberger's algorithm [8, 7] . Recently, more efficient algorithms have been proposed. To date, F5 [13] is the most efficient for computing Gröbner bases (a brief description of this algorithm is given in Appendix A). Here we will concentrate on Gröbner bases w.r.t. lexicographical and degree reverse lexicographical orders.
LEX and DRL Gröbner bases
Lexicographical Gröbner bases (LEX Gröbner bases) offer a way for eliminating variables.
The shape of degree reverse lexicographical Gröbner bases (DRL Gröbner bases) is much more complicated. However, DRL Gröbner bases have several interesting properties. For instance, the polynomials of lowest degree of an ideal I appear in a DRL Gröbner bases of this ideal. More precisely:
f ∈ I}, and G be a DRL Gröbner basis of I. Then:
Proof. A proof of this theorem can be found in [3] .
We should mention that the variable xn has a special role for the DRL order.
, and m be a positive integer. Then:
Sum, Intersection, and Quotient of Ideals
We now go over the definitions of several operations on ideals.
Definition 4. Let I and J be ideals in K[x1, . . . , xn]. Then: -the sum of I and J , noted I + J , is the I + J = {f + g : f ∈ I and g ∈ J }. -the intersection of I and J , is defined as I ∩ J = {f ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn] : f ∈ I and f ∈ J }. -I + J and I ∩ J are ideals.
Given two ideals and their generators, we would like to compute a set of generators for the intersection. This is actually much more delicate than the analogous problem for sums, which is straightforward. Indeed, I = p1, . . . , ps + J = g1, . . . , gr = p1, . . . , ps, g1, . . . , gr . The following result permits to solve the problem for intersections.
Theorem 3. Let I, J be ideals in K[x1, . . . , xn], and t be a new variable. Then:
where t · I = {t · h : h ∈ I}, and
This result, together with the Elimination Theorem (i.e. Theorem 1), provide a method for computing intersections of ideals. Given ideals I = p1, . . . , ps and J = g1, . . . , gr in K[x1, . . . , xn], we consider the ideal t · p1, . . . , t · ps, (1 − t)·g1, . . . , (1−t)·gr ⊂ K[t, x1, . . . , xn]. Those elements of a LEX Gröbner basis (with t LEX x1 LEX · · · LEX xn) that do not contain the variable t will exactly form a Gröbner basis for I ∩ J . Definition 5. Let I and J be ideals in K[x1, . . . , xn]. The ideal quotient of I by J , denoted I : J , is the set
The following proposition relates the quotient operation to the sum and intersection operations. Proposition 1. Let I, and {I k } 1≤k≤r be ideals in K[x1, . . . , xn]. Then:
If f is a polynomial and I an ideal, we shall write I : f instead of I : f . A special case of ii) is:
We now address the question of computing generators of the ideal quotient I : J . The following observation is crucial:
In order to construct a basis of an ideal quotient, we proceed as follows. Given ideals I = p1, . . . , ps and J = g1, . . . , gr in K[x1, . . . , xn], we compute a basis for the intersections I ∩ g1 , . . . , I ∩ gn by using the above described method. For each i, we divide by f each element of a basis of I ∩ gi . This leads to a basis for I : gi. We then obtain a basis for I : J by computing the intersections T r k=1 (I : gi).
2R − schemes
In 
. This scheme has been broken by J. Patarin at Crypto'95 [22] . One-round schemes [17, 18] are generalizations of C * . The public key of these schemes is indeed of the form "t • ψ • s", where t, s are two affine mappings over K n , and a ψ : K n → K n is a bijective mapping given by n multivariate polynomials of degree two. J. Patarin and L. Goubin [17, 18] propose several constructions for ψ:
where n = P i ni, and each Si :
(a1, . . . , an) →`a1, a2 + q1(a1), a3 + q2(a1, a2, a3), . . . , an + qn−1(a1, . . . , an−1)´, where each qi is quadratic. 3. Combinations of S-box and triangular functions.
They showed that all these constructions are insecure [17, 18] . To circumvent attacks, they introduce two-round schemes whose public key is the composition of two one-round schemes. The secret key of two-round schemes consists of:
Three affine bijections r, s, t : K n → K n . Two applications ψ, φ : K n → K n , given by n quadratic polynomials.
The public key is composed of n polynomials p1, . . . , pn of total degree 4 describing:
When all the polynomials are given, this scheme is called 2R scheme. If only some of them are given, it is called 2R − scheme. The public-key part of the computation is merely an application of the mapping p (for encrypting a message, or checking the validity of a signature). For the secret-key computations, we need to invert the mappings ψ and φ.
The authors then propose to choose the mappings among the constructions 1, 2, 3 described above and also:
4. C * functions: monomials over an extension of degree n over K,
5
. D * functions [16] .
In [17, 18] , it has been proved that when ψ is chosen in the classes 2. and 4., then the resulting 2R scheme is weak. It is not clear that a similar result holds for 2R − schemes. Anyway, does composing two weak one-round schemes leads to a secure scheme ? The answer is closely related to the difficulty of the following problem:
u , and g = (g1, . . . , gn) ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn] n , such that:
h1(x), . . . , hu(x)´=`f1`g1(x), . . . , gn(x)´, . . . , fu`g1(x), . . . , gn(x)´´, Note that their method only works when u = n, or u = n − 1 [26] . To the best of our knowledge, there exists no previously known algorithm for solving FDP when u < n − 1. An efficient method for solving FDP in this case would permit to decompose 2R − schemes into two independent schemes given by quadratic polynomials. To break these schemes, we then would only have to solve two quadratic systems. As mentioned by J. Patarin and L. Goubin [18] , this would make the principle of two-round schemes, including 2R − , useless.
A general algorithm for solving FDP
In this part, we present a new algorithm for solving FDP. Our approach is inspired on the works of D.F. Ye, Z.D. Dai, and K.Y. Lam [25, 26] . According to these authors, we can restrict our attention to homogeneous instances of FDP [25] . The homogenization of a polynomial p ∈ K[x1, . . . , xn], denoted p * , is defined by p * (x0, x1, . . . , xn) =
p(x1/x0, . . . , xn/x0), where x0 is a new variable. For any mapping f : K n → K u , given by the polynomials f1, . . . , fu, we define its homogenization by f (1, x1, . . . , xn) , . . . , f * n (1, x1, . . . , xn)´. We have:
Note 1. In [25] , it is stated that this lemma is correct only if deg(f )deg(g) > |K|. We no longer need this condition over K[x1, . . . , xn].
Thus, if we can decompose h * = f * • g * , then a decomposition of h = f • g is simply obtained by dehomogenization of f * and g * [25] . Now, we assume that f : K n → K u and g : K n → K n are two homogeneous functions of degree two. Finally, let h = f • g, and {hi} 1≤i≤u , {fi} 1≤i≤u , {gi} 1≤i≤n be the components of h, f, g respectively.
Description of the algorithm
The aim of our algorithm is to find the vector space L(g) = Vect(g1, . . . , gn) generated by g1, . . . , gn. More precisely, this vector space will be recovered from a DRL Gröbner basis of a suitable ideal. Note that the knowledge of L(g) is sufficient for decomposing h. Indeed, any bijective linear combination A of the gis leads to a decomposition of h since:
Let us first assume that we know the vector space L(g). For all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ u:
Therefore, for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ u:
By comparing the coefficients in the right-most and left-most parts of these equalities, we obtain a linear system of O(uC 2 n+2 ) equations in the uC 2 n+2 unknown coefficients of the fis. It seems difficult to rigorously evaluate the rank of this linear system, a question that has been avoided in the previous works on FDP [25, 26] . However, it is very likely that this linear system is of full rank when the fis are dense polynomials. For the instances of FDP used in 2R
− schemes, we experimentally only obtain linear systems of full rank. The difficult part is actually to determine the vector space L(g). For this, we observe that:
The polynomials g1, . . . , gn being of degree two, their partial derivatives are of degree one. Hence:
This ideal ∂I h usually provides enough information for recovering the polynomials g1, . . . , gn.
Theorem 5. Let M (d) be the set of monomials of degree d ≥ 0 in x1, . . . , xn, and
Then, for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n:
Proof. We first study the case d = 0. LetṼ =Ṽ0 be the linear space generated by the partial derivatives of the his, i.e.:Ṽ
According to (2) , each element ofṼ can be written as a sum of {x k g } 1≤k, ≤n . Now let AṼ ∈ M n 2 ×n 2 (K) be a matrix associated to the linear transformation Vect`{x k g } 1≤k, ≤n´ →Ṽ . For some basis:
One can see at once that the xngis lie inṼ if the number of linearly independent rows of this matrix is at least equal to its number of columns. That is, xngi ∈ ∂I h , for all i,
Observe that dim(Ṽ ) is upper-bounded by un. Thus, dim(Ṽ ) ≥ n|M (1)| = n 2 only holds if u = n. This explains why the method proposed in [25, 26] is limited to 2R schemes. To circumvent this problem, we have to consider a vector space of higher dimension. This is the motivation for considering:
From (2), we deduce that each polynomial ofṼ d can be written as a sum of elements of:
Let then AṼ 
Remark 1. At the end of this part, we will provide an explicit value of d in function of the ratio n/u.
According to Theorem 5, the polynomials gis are contained, up to some power of xn, in ∂I h . Therefore, the quotient of this ideal by a suitable power of xn contains the polynomials g1, . . . , gn. 
Proof. The proof of this corollary is obviously deduced from Theorem 5, and very definition of the quotient. Thus each element of L(g) is included in ∂I h : (x d+1 n ). Let then G be a (reduced) DRL Gröbner basis of this ideal. It is then natural to consider the set Bg = Vect`g ∈ G : deg(g) = 2´, since according to Theorem 2:
L(g) = Bg, if #Bg = n, and min`deg(g) : g ∈ G´= 2.
If these conditions are not fulfilled, then one can not recover efficiently L(g) from Bg. Observe that the condition #Bg = n implies that there exists a unique decomposition (up to bijective linear combinations). To get away with this problem, we can apply several heuristics such as computing ∂I h : (x 
The algorithm Algo FDP
We describe now our algorithm for general instances of FDP, i.e. we no longer suppose here that h is given by homogeneous polynomials. 
Compute a reduced 2-DRL Gröbner basis
AlgoFDP returns a solution of FDP (and not Fail) in: ). This step can be done as explained in Section 2. However, an alternative method can be used in this particular situation. This is due to the particular role of xn in a DRL order. From Lemma 1, we know that if x d+1 n divides the leading monomial of a polynomial, then it also divides the entire polynomial. Thus, we can restrict our attention to polynomials of a DRL Gröbner Bases G of ∂I * h whose leading monomials contain x d+1 n . One can see directly that:
: g ∈ G , and x d+1 n |LM(g , ≺DRL)
« .
More precisely, it is sufficient to compute a reduced (d + 3)-DRL Gröbner basis of ∂I * h . According to Appendix A, this can be done with the F5 algorithm in O(n 3(d+3) ). From a practical point of view, the two methods proposed for computing G are similar. But the last one is more suitable for evaluating the complexity. Remark 3. It should be noticed that our algorithm can easily be adapted for polynomials f of degree greater that 2.
Comparison with previous approach In short, our method can be viewed as a generalization of the approach of D.F. Ye, Z.D. Dai, and K.Y. Lam [25, 26] . When u = n, it is sufficient to consider the ideal ∂I * h : (x 1 n ) for recovering L(g). This is a simplified description of the method described in [25, 26] . When u < n, ∂I * h : (x 1 n ) no longer provides enough information for recovering L(g). To overcome this difficulty, we proposed here to consider ideals of the form ∂I * h : (x d+1 n ). We then proved that L(g) is contained in this ideal as soon as d is sufficiently large.
It is important to know the exact value of the parameter d. This value can be lower-bounded in fonction of the ratio n/u. For this, we observe that (n + 1)|M (d + 1)| = (n + 1)C d+1 n+1+d and dim(Ṽ * d ) is very likely to be equal (u + 1)(n + 1)C d n+d . We then obtain that d should verify:
For instance, if the number of equations removed (i.e. n − u) is smaller than n 2
, this yields a complexity of O(n 12 ), and O(n 9 ) if u = n. We will show now that this approximation is perfectly coherent with our experimental results.
Experimental results

Generation of the instances
We have only considered instances h = f • g of FDP admitting a solution. We constructed these instances in the following way: -f = t • ψ • s and g = φ • r, with r, s, t • ψ • s : K n → K n are random affine bijections, and ψ, φ : K n → K n are S-box functions contructed as explained in Section 3. We then remove r ≥ 0 polynomials of h.
Programming language -Workstation
The experimental results have been obtained with a Xeon bi-processor 3.2 Ghz, with 6 Gb of Ram. The instances of FDP have been generated using the Maple software. We used our own implementation (in language C) of F5 for computing truncated Gröbner bases.
Table Notations
The following notations are used in the table below: -n, the number of variables, -b, the number of blocks (as defined in Section 3), -ni, the number of variables in each block (see Section 3), -q, the size of the field, -r, the number of polynomials removed, -d theo = n u − 1 , the predicted (see 4.2) value of d for which AlgoFDP returns a solution -d real , the real value of d for which AlgoFDP returns a solution -T , the total time taken by our algorithm, -√ q n , the current security bound [18, 6] for 2R − schemes.
Practical Results
Let us now present results obtained with our algorithm. 
